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Equilibrium unemployment and investment under 
product and labour market imperfections 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 11/2004 





The study looks at the implications of product market competition and investment 
for price setting, wage bargaining and thereby for equilibrium unemployment in 
an economy with product and labour market imperfections. We show that 
intensified product market competition will reduce equilibrium unemployment, 
whereas the effect of increased capital intensity is more complex. Higher capital 
intensity will decrease the equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour is less than one, while the reverse happens 
when this elasticity is higher than one, but smaller than the elasticity of 
substitution between products. Finally, we demonstrate how labour and product 
market imperfections, characterised by the wage and price setting mark-ups, affect 
the optimal capital stock. Our findings raise important questions for future 
empirical research. 
 
Key words: equilibrium unemployment, product market imperfections, 
investment, wage bargaining 
 
JEL classification numbers: E22, E24, J51, L11  
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Rakenteellinen työttömyys ja investoinnit 
epätäydellisesti kilpailevilla lopputuote- ja 
työmarkkinoilla 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 11/2004 





Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan tuotemarkkinakilpailun ja investointien vaiku-
tusta yritysten hinnoitteluun, työmarkkinoiden palkkaneuvotteluihin ja rakenteelli-
seen työttömyyteen taloudessa, jossa sekä lopputuotemarkkinat että työmarkkinat 
ovat epätäydellisesti kilpailevia. Osoitetaan, että kasvava tuotemarkkinakilpailu 
supistaa rakenteellista työttömyyttä, kun taas lisääntyvän pääomaintensiteetin 
vaikutus on monimutkaisempi. Suurempi pääomaintensiteetti vähentää rakenteel-
lista työttömyyttä, kun pääoman ja työn substituutiojousto tuotannossa on pienem-
pi kuin yksi, mutta riippuvuus on päinvastainen, kun substituutiojousto on suu-
rempi kuin yksi mutta pienempi kuin lopputuotteiden välinen substituutiojousto 
eli lopputuotteiden kysynnän hintajousto. Lopuksi näytetään, miten lopputuote- ja 
työmarkkinoiden epätäydellisyydet hinnanmuodostuksen ja palkkojen määräyty-
misen kautta vaikuttavat yritysten optimaalisen pääomakannan valintaan. Työssä 
esitetyt tulokset herättävät tärkeitä kysymyksiä tulevalle empiiriselle tutkimuksel-
le. 
 
Avainsanat: rakenteellinen työttömyys, lopputuotemarkkinoiden epätäydellinen 
kilpailu, investoinnit, palkkaneuvottelut 
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We analyze the interaction between labour and product market imperfections as 
well as the role of investment behaviour – affected by capital markets – from the 
point of view of equilibrium unemployment. Our study fulfils a twofold purpose. 
Firstly, we explore the impact of long-term investments on wage formation, and 
thereby on unemployment, in an economy characterized by labour and product 
market imperfections. Secondly, we investigate the consequences of imperfections 
in the product market on equilibrium unemployment. In fact, we will design a 
theoretical model, which demonstrates that there are important interaction effects 
between labour market imperfections, product market imperfections and long-
term investments and that these effects have implications for equilibrium 
unemployment. Finally, we explore how labour and product market imperfections 
affect the optimal capital stock. 
  The employment consequences of long-term investments have for a long time 
been a controversial issue in economics and this issue seems to underlie many 
disputes between firm owners and labour unions. In conventional models of 
imperfectly competitive labour markets - a la´ Layard and Nickell and Jackmann 
(1991) – the investment behaviour has no effect on equilibrium unemployment. 
This is due to the specification of a Cobb-Douglas production function, which 
implies a constant wage elasticity of labour demand. Hence, investments or 
interest rate fluctuations will have no effect on the wage determination, achieved 
through wage negotiations due to the constant wage elasticity, and therefore no 
effect on equilibrium unemployment. 
  Many reservations can be raised against the Cobb-Douglas specification. The 
Cobb-Douglas specification does not seem to lie in conformity with empirics (see 
eg Lucas 1969, Rowthorn 1995, 1999 and Duffy and Papageorgiou 2000). 
Furthermore, it has also been argued that when trying to explain variations in the 
labour share there is a need to depart from the usual assumption of a Cobb-
Douglas production function (see Bentolila and Saint-Paul 2002). Moreover, and 
related, medium- to long-term changes in unemployment appear to be correlated 
with medium- to long-term changes in private investment – a feature which does 
not seem to be consistent with predictions generated by models with Cobb-
Douglas production functions (see Blanchard 1997 and, for some empirics, eg 
Herbertsson and Zoega 2002). On the theoretical side Phelps (1994) has argued, 
applying an intertemporal customer market model, that higher real interest rates 
will raise the mark-ups in the product markets, leading to higher equilibrium 
unemployment. In the present paper we abandon the Cobb-Douglas specification 
and introduce a link between the long-term investment decisions and the 
negotiated wages by focusing on a more general class of CES production 
functions.  
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  The employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in 
product markets have been analyzed to some extent in the recent literature. 
However, in this literature the potential role of investments has been abstracted 
away by postulating a production function with labour as the only production 
factor either in a linear (see Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, Ebell and Haefke 
2003) or Cobb-Douglas form (see Spector 2004). In what follows we extend the 
approach applied in these models by focusing on a general class of CES 
production functions within a framework where we capture the imperfections in 
product markets through monopolistic competition and those of the labour 
markets through a ‘right-to-manage’ union bargaining model. In particular, we 
incorporate the general CES-type production function with capital and labour 
inputs in such a way that the elasticity of substitution between the production 
factors will depend on the capital-labour ratio.
1 
  In the present analysis we show that while intensified product market 
competition will decrease equilibrium unemployment, the effect of capital 
intensity is more complex. Higher capital intensity will moderate the negotiated 
wage rate and thereby reduce equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour is less than one. However, a higher capital 
intensity will have reverse effects when the elasticity of substitution is higher than 
one but smaller than the price elasticity of demand in the product market. Our 
analysis further verifies that the relationship between the capital stock and 
equilibrium unemployment would vanish in the special case of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Finally, we explore the determination of the optimal capital 
stock in the presence of product and labour market imperfections. Our new 
theoretical findings provide an important topic for empirical research. 
  We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model as 
well as the time sequence of decisions. Price setting and labour demand by firms 
are studied in section 3. In section 4 we analyze the wage determination through 
Nash bargaining. Section 5 explores the determinants of equilibrium 
unemployment. In section 6 we investigate investment decisions under labour and 




                                                 
1 Hoon (1998) has developed a model with a different focus to study the interactions of 
unemployment and economic growth by assuming that the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour is less than one under the efficiency wage hypothesis.  
9 
2 Basic  framework 
We focus on a model with product and labour market imperfections. In the long 
run, at stage 1, firms commit themselves to their investment programs, which 
determine the capital stocks. The investment decisions are made in anticipation of 
their effects on wage setting, price setting and labour demand. At stage 2 there is 
wage negotiation between firms and labour unions and at this stage the firms are 
committed to their investments.
2 The wage negotiations take place in anticipation 
of the consequences for labour demand and price setting. Finally, at stage 3 firms 
make employment decisions and set prices by taking the negotiated wage rate and 
investment decision as given. 
  We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent 
sections we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using 
backward induction. 
 













We postulate (for each firm i) a CES production function of the type 
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where Ki denotes firm i’s capital stock, Li is the amount of labour, and a and σ are 
parameters satisfying 0 < a < 1 and σ > 0, respectively. The parameter a is often 
called the distribution parameter (see eg Arrow at al 1961), while σ captures the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. As we will see, this 
production function opens up a rich and interesting relationship between the 
capital stock and equilibrium unemployment. For reasons of comparison we also 
repeatedly consider the conventional case of Cobb-Douglas production function 
                                                 
2 This timing structure captures the idea of long-term investment decisions, which are inflexible at 
the stage when the wage negotiations are undertaken. Such a timing structure seems plausible 
when the investments represent, for example, irreversible technology choices.  
10 
 




i i i i = =
−  (2.2) 
 
where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is equal to one. 
Notice that in (2.2) the parameter a defines the labour share of production. 
 
 
3  Price setting and labour demand 
The product market is modelled to operate with monopolistic competition a lá 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and the firms face consumers endowed with the 
following CES- utility function 
 



















= ∑  (3.1) 
 
where s denotes the elasticity of substitution between products. This elasticity 
could be thought of as an increasing function of the number of products offered 
according to  1 ) n ( g s s > = , where  s , 0 ) n ( ' g >  is a constant and n is the number of 
products (and firms). In the short run the number of firms is fixed so that s is 
given, while in the long run there is free entry of new firms so that s is determined 
endogenously (see eg Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). We take this elasticity of 
substitution (and thereby the number of products offered) as the measure of the 
degree of product market competition. A higher elasticity of substitution means a 
higher degree of product market competition and the limiting case of perfect 
competition is associated with the elasticity of substitution s tending to infinity. 
The utility function in (3.1) has the special feature that an increase in the number 





−  in the square brackets in (3.1). However, the increase of the number of 
products increases the elasticity of substitution between products, and thus the 
elasticity of demand facing firms (for more discussion and motivation see 
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, p. 882). 
  A firm i decides on price and employment so as to maximize the following 
profit function 
 
{ . L w ) L , K ( R p max i i i i i i i
L , p i i
− = π  (3.2) 
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At this stage the firm takes the negotiated wage rate wi and the capital stock Ki as 
given. From the underlying utility functions of the consumers, given by (3.1), the 
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≡ ∑  is the index of the aggregate 
price level, M is the aggregate nominal income and s  >  1 is the elasticity of 
substitution between different products. Thus, M/P denotes the real income. In 
Appendix 1 we derive the demand function (3.3) from the CES-utility function 
(3.1)
3. Furthermore, if we assume that the rents from capital are competed away in 
the long run, the aggregate nominal income is 
 
[] , uB w ) u 1 ( N M + − =  (3.4) 
 
where N denotes the number of individuals in the economy, u is the 
unemployment rate, w is the negotiated wage rate and B is the unemployment 
compensation. It is important to point out that at this stage of the game the 
aggregate nominal income M is exogenous, but later on both the wage rate w and 
the unemployment rate u are endogenized. 

























− =  (3.5) 
 
By imposing market-clearing in the product markets, Di = Ri, and by using (3.5) 

































































⎛ = − = π  (3.6) 
 
where M, P, Ki and wi are taken as given. 
  The necessary first-order condition associated with (3.6) can be expressed as 
                                                 











































































































a ) 1 s (
 (3.8) 
 
By imposing the symmetry condition pi  =  P for all i (3.8) can be simplified 
according to the following price-setting rule 
 











































= µ , with µ′(s)  <  0, is the mark-up factor associated with the 
pricing equilibrium. This mark-up factor depends negatively on the elasticity of 
substitution between products. From equation (3.9) and using the definition of the 
aggregate nominal income, M in (3.4), we can attach the following qualitative 




































In the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function (2.2) we can use a similar 
procedure to find the following price setting rule 
 


















= σ  (3.11) 
 
As one can see the qualitative properties of (3.11) are similar to those of (3.9). 




Proposition 1 Higher wage rates, higher unemployment compensations or lower 
elasticities of substitution between products will all raise the equilibrium price in 
the product market, whereas higher unemployment rates or higher capital stocks 
will decrease it, ceteris paribus. 
 
The pass-through effects - characterized in Proposition 1 - seem to appeal to 
intuition and several of these features are well known from the literature. An 
important new aspect in Proposition 1 is the role of the capital stock for the price 
setting. This aspect has been neglected in the earlier literature (see Blanchard and 
Giavazzi 2003, Ebell and Haefke 2003 and Spector 2004, where either linear or 
Cobb-Douglas production functions with labour being the only input were 
considered). An increase in the capital stock will increase production and thereby 
induce lower prices, ceteris paribus. This provides an alternative argument for the 
result by Phelps (1994) according to which lower interest rates will decrease the 
mark-up in the product markets. 
  In order to simplify notation we from now on mostly abstract from the firm-
specific index associated with product i. Doing so the necessary first-order 
condition determining labour demand can be written as 
 
0 w pRL L = − = π  (3.12) 
 
with the associated second-order condition  . 0 R p pR L L LL LL < + = π . Using the 



















































K L  (3.13) 
 
with LK > 0 and L(w/p)
 < 0. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function 















=  (3.14) 
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with LK > 0 and L(w/p) < 0 as well. Notice that in the formulations of the labour 
demand functions in (3.13) and (3.14) the product price is endogenous as it 
implicitly depends on the wage rate. 
  The wage elasticity of labour demand, which turns out to be important later 
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= − = η
= σ  (3.16) 
 
where . ) s ( s / ) 1 s (
1 − µ = −  From (3.15) we can conclude that the wage elasticity of 
labour demand depends on the following four factors: the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour (σ), the degree of competition in the product markets 
(s), the capital-labour ratio (k ≡ K/L) and the distribution parameter a. We observe 
that intensified product market competition, measured by higher elasticity of 
substitution between the products, increases the wage elasticity of labour demand, 
ie  ηs  >  0. It is natural that more intense product market competition makes it 
harder for the firms to survive with higher wages and thus increased competition 
makes the firms’ employment decisions more sensitive to changes in the wage 
rate. This feature holds true also in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function 
(see equation (3.16)).
4 When we approach a situation with perfect competition in 
the product markets (ie, as s→∞) the wage elasticity of labour demand converges 












1 , which reduces to 1/(1 - a) in the Cobb-Douglas case. 
                                                 
4 There is empirical evidence according to which product market regulation has decreased and 
thereby competition increased in OECD countries during the 1990s (for evidence, see Nicoletti, 
Bassanini, Ernst, Jean, Santiago and Swaim 2001). Gersbach (2000) summarizes three 
mechanisms (lower markups, higher total factor productivity and expanded sets of product 
varieties), through which reductions in product market imperfections might enhance employment. 
Blanchard and Philippon (2003) design a “minimalist model” to explore the effects of intensified 
product market competition when labour unions learn slowly about structural changes in the 
economic environment and when trust plays an important role in the labour market.  
15 
  Next we ask, what is the effect of the capital-labour ratio k on the wage 
elasticity of labour demand? This is an interesting question because, for example, 
the competitiveness of the capital markets and thereby the size of the capital stock 



































where s > 1. The comparative static effects of the capital intensity, k, on the wage 
elasticity of labour demand are illustrated in the (σ,s)-space in Figure 2. In this 
respect we can report the following findings: (i) Under gross complementarity 
between capital and labour (σ  <  1) higher capital intensity increases the wage 
elasticity of labour demand. (ii) The same happens under gross substitutability 
(σ > 1) as long as the elasticity of substitution between products (s) is lower than 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the production function. 
(iii) Under gross substitutability (σ  >  1) the wage elasticity is a decreasing 
function of the capital intensity if the elasticity of substitution between products 
(s) is higher than the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the 
production function. We can explain these relationships by reference to the 
following interpretations: While under gross substitutability, ceteris paribus, a 
higher capital intensity reduces the wage elasticity of labour demand, a higher 
capital stock will decrease the price mark-up and therefore has the reverse effect 
on the wage elasticity. The latter effect dominates when s > σ whereas the former 
effect dominates if s < σ. In this latter case a higher capital intensity will increase 




Figure 2.  The effect of the capital-labour ratio on the wage 
      elasticity of labour demand 
 















We can summarize our findings in 
 
Proposition 2 Intensified product market competition will always increase wage 
elasticity of labour demand. A higher capital intensity will increase the wage 
elasticity of labour demand when the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital is less than one or when it is higher than one but smaller than the 
elasticity of substitution between products. But, if the elasticity of substitution 
between the production factors is higher than the elasticity of substitution between 
the products, an increase in capital intensity will decrease the wage elasticity. 
 
From Proposition 2 we can conclude that the technological elasticity of 
substitution between the production factors is of primary importance for the 
relationship between capital intensity and the wage elasticity of labour demand. 
Basically, the wage elasticity of labour demand is an increasing function of the 
capital intensity except for such a case of technological gross substitutability 
where an offsetting effect with reduced price mark-ups is sufficiently strong. Such 
an offsetting effect is sufficiently strong precisely when the degree of product 
market competition is high. 
 Finally,  (3.16)  reveals the following result in the Cobb-Douglas case 
 
Corollary 1: The wage elasticity of labour demand is independent of the capital 
intensity in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
  
17 
Corollary 1 verifies the conventional assumption, whereby there is no relationship 
between wage elasticity and investment under circumstances with Cobb-Douglas 
production functions. Thus, this type of production function eliminates the 
potential channel through which credit market behaviour might impact on wage 
elasticity via the determination of the capital stock. 
 
 
4  Wage determination via Nash bargaining 
We now turn to look at the stage of wage determination by taking the capital stock 
K as given. We apply the Nash bargaining solution within the context of the 
‘right-to-manage’ approach according to which employment is unilaterally 
determined by the firms. The wage bargaining takes place in anticipation of 
optimal price and employment decisions by the firms. Following the Nash 
bargaining approach the firm and the labour union negotiate with respect to the 
wage so as to solve the optimization problem 
 
{ [] [ ] 0 and 0 that so wL ) L , K ( pR ) b w ( L max p L
1 * * *
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where the relative bargaining power of the union is β and that of the firm is 
(1 - β), EU ) b w ( L
* = − , b is the (exogenous) outside option available to union 
members and  wL ) L , K ( pR − = π . The outside options for the firm and the union 
are  K
o ∆ − = π  and  Mb U
o = , respectively, where M is the number of labour 
union members and  r 1+ = ∆  denotes the cost of capital. Under these assumptions 
the necessary first-order condition for the wage determination can be written as 
 
0 ) 1 (
U
U w w =
π
π












η + η −









































Substituting the expressions (4.3) and (4.4) into the first-order condition (4.2) 
yields, after some rearrangement, the following Nash bargaining solutions for the 
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β − + − η β
β
+ =
= σ  (4.6) 
 
According to (4.5) and (4.6) the negotiated wage rate depends positively on the 
outside option (b) and on the relative bargaining power of the labour union (β), 
while negatively on wage elasticity of labour demand (η). As we described in 
Proposition 2, the wage elasticity of labour demand depends positively on product 
market competition (s). Further, the relationship between the wage elasticity of 
demand (η) and the capital-labour ratio (k) depends on the size of the elasticity of 
substitution (σ) between capital and labour in the production function as well as 
on the relative sizes of σ and s. In particular, as we approach perfect product 
market competition with s→∞ in the Cobb-Douglas case, the wage rate converges 
towards [] [ ] b ) 1 /( 1 b a / ) a 1 ( 1 − η β + = − β + , where η = 1/(1-a) is the wage elasticity 
of labour demand under perfect product market competition. 






















































































Expression (4.7) characterizes the capital stock as a strategic commitment device. 
We can delineate the outcome (4.7) as follows: First, under gross 
complementarity between capital and labour (σ  <  1) higher capital intensity 
decreases the negotiated wage rate via two channels: (1) it becomes harder for the 
union to extract rent in negotiations because of higher wage elasticity of labour 
demand, and (2) a higher capital-labor ratio increases the negative effect of the  
19 












 when (σ < 1) and thus moderates wage 
formation. Second, the reverse happens under gross substitutability (σ > 1) if the 
elasticity of substitution is smaller than the price elasticity of product demand. 
The interpretation of this finding is analogous to the former case. Finally, if under 
gross substitutability (σ > 1) the price elasticity of product demand is smaller than 
the elasticity of substitution, the effect of capital intensity on wage determination 
is a priori ambiguous and it depends on the relative bargaining power of labour 
union, the level of capital intensity, the degree of product market competition, and 
the value of the distribution parameter. In particular, one can see from (4.7) that in 














































Figure 3 illustrates the effect of the capital intensity on the negotiated wage in the 
(σ, s)-space for different values of the relative bargaining power of the labour 
union. We observe that an increased capital intensity induces wage moderation for 
combinations with sufficiently high elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour and a sufficiently low degree of competition in the product market, 
measured by the elasticity of substitution between products. On the other hand, a 
sufficiently strong intensification of competition in the product market will 
change this relationship. Hence, with a reasonably moderate elasticity of 
substitution between the production factors sufficiently intense product market 
competition will lead to a relationship whereby the negotiated wage rate increases 
as a function of the capital intensity. From Figure 3 we can also infer that the 
region characterized by wage moderation is increasing as a function of the 
bargaining power of the labour union. This means that the capital intensity 
provides a stronger strategic commitment device for the generation of wage 
moderation the larger is the labour market imperfections characterized by the 
bargaining power of the labour unions.
5 Figure 4 illustrates how the distribution 
parameter a impacts on the relationship between wage formation and capital 
intensity. 
  We now summarize our analysis of wage bargaining in 
 
                                                 
5 This feature reminds of the wage-moderating effect of profit sharing on the negotiated base 
wage. As Koskela and Stenbacka (2003) demonstrate, the wage-moderating effect of profit sharing 
is stronger the larger are the imperfections in the labour market.  
20 
Proposition 3 The negotiated wage rate depends negatively on the wage elasticity 
of labour demand and therefore intensified product market competition will 
decrease the wage rate. Higher capital intensity will decrease the negotiated 
wage rate if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is smaller 
than one while the reverse happens if it is higher than one, but smaller than the 
price elasticity of product demand. But if the elasticity of substitution between the 
production factors exceeds both one and the price elasticity of substitution 
between products, the impact of capital intensity is a priori ambiguous. 
 
Figure 3.  The effect of the capital-labor ratio on the wage 
      rate with different values of the labour union’s 
     bargaining  power 
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Figure 4.  The effect of the capital-labor ratio on the wage 
      rate with different distribution parameter values 
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Finally, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas we can replicate the Layard, 




Corollary 2 With a Cobb-Douglas production function capital intensity will have 
no effect on the negotiated wage. 
 
From the negotiated Nash wage we get interesting special cases. If all the 
bargaining power lies with the union (β  =  1), the Nash bargaining solution is 
simplified to the monopoly union solution 
 
b
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= σ ≠ σ  (4.7’) 
 
                                                 
6 It is interesting to observe that wages are assumed to always depend positively on the capital 
intensity in Denny and Nickell (1992). As (4.7) makes clear this is far from self-evident.  
22 
according to which the wage mark-up depends negatively on the wage elasticity 
of labour demand which is a function of the capital-labour ratio k when σ ≠ 1 
while it is not when σ = 1. Further the wage elasticity of labour demand is an 
increasing function of the price elasticity of product demand s. 
  If all the bargaining power lies with the firm (β = 0), the relationship between 
the negotiated wage and the capital intensity disappears. In this case the 
negotiated wage converges to the competitive wage with w
C = b,  ie  the  wage 
mark-up is eroded. Intuitively this seems to make sense for the following reason. 
The capital intensity serves as a strategic commitment device, which will affect 
the distribution of the rents achieved through bargaining, in imperfectly 
competitive labour markets.
7 Once the labour market imperfections are eroded the 
capital intensity can no longer play such a strategic role. 
  There is empirical evidence according to which higher product market 
competition will moderate wage formation. See eg Abowd and Lemieux (1993) 
using Canadian data, Nickell and Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) using data 
from British manufacturing companies and Neven and Röller and Zhang (1999), 
who have used the data from eight European airline companies to analyze links 
between product market competition and union power. Nickell (1999) presents a 
survey of this literature. 
 
 
5  Product markets, capital intensity and 
equilibrium unemployment 
Above we have characterized wage formation, labour demand and price setting 
from a partial equilibrium perspective. We now move on to explore the 
determinants of equilibrium unemployment in a general equilibrium framework. 
We are particularly interested in the relationships between capital stock, and 
thereby the capital intensity, the intensity of competition in the product market 
and the equilibrium unemployment. 
  According to (4.5) and (4.6) the negotiated wage rate in industry i is of the 
form b A w i
N
i = , where the mark-up factors in the cases of CES- and Cobb-
Douglas production functions 
 
σ
σ − ≠ σ
−
β − + − η β
β




) 1 ( ) 1 ) s , k ( (
1 A  (5.1) 
                                                 
7 In other contexts both the capital structure and the compensation scheme have been shown to 
constitute a similar type of commitment device (see eg Dasgupta and Sengupta 1993 and Koskela 











β − + − η β
β
+ =
= σ  (5.2) 
 
are, in principle, industry-specific. We impose symmetry assumptions meaning 
that Ai = A and 
N N
i w w =  for all i. In a general equilibrium the term b should be 
re-interpreted as the relevant outside option, which we specify as 
 
uB w ) u 1 ( b
N + − =  (5.3) 
 
where u is the unemployment rate, B captures the unemployment benefit and w
N 
denotes the negotiated wage rate in all identical industries. Assuming a constant 
benefit replacement ratio 
N w / B q =  and substituting (5.3) for b into the Nash 














N  (5.4) 
 
where the wage mark-up A is given by (5.1) for σ ≠ 1 and by (5.2) for σ = 1. 
  According to (5.4) a higher benefit-replacement ratio, q, and a higher mark-up 
in the wage determination, A, will increase equilibrium unemployment. Further, 
from the mark-ups in the wage determination we can conclude that higher wage 
elasticity of labour demand will decrease equilibrium unemployment. In fact, 






















σ −  (5.5) 
 
meaning that intensified product market competition will moderate the wage 
mark-up in the general case σ ≠ 1. The same qualitative result holds true also in 
the case with σ = 1 as can be seen by differentiating (5.2) with respect to s. Hence, 
intensified product market competition will, ceteris paribus, decrease equilibrium 







  As for the impact of the capital-labour ratio on equilibrium unemployment we 
















































































k  (5.6) 
 
(5.6) offers a characterization of the capital stock as a strategic commitment 








, we can 
explore the effect of the capital intensity on equilibrium unemployment by 
combining (4.7) and (5.6). The relationship between the negotiated wage and the 
capital intensity was characterized in Proposition 3. According to Proposition 3 
more intense product market competition will, ceteris paribus, moderate the 
negotiated wages and thereby decrease equilibrium unemployment, while the 
relationship between capital intensity, wage formation and thereby the 
relationship between capital intensity and equilibrium unemployment is more 
complicated. More specifically, it depends on the size of the elasticity of 
substitution between production factors, on the degree of product market 
competition, measured by the price elasticity of demand as well as on the relative 
sizes of these two parameters. 
  Our findings concerning the determinants of equilibrium unemployment can 
now be summarized in 
 
Proposition 4  Increased product market competition will reduce equilibrium 
unemployment. Higher capital intensity will reduce equilibrium unemployment 
when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is smaller than one 
while the reverse happens when it is higher than one, but smaller than the price 
elasticity of product demand. But if the elasticity of substitution lies between one 
and the elasticity of substitution between the production factors (larger than one), 
then the effect of capital intensity on equilibrium unemployment is a priori 
ambiguous. 
 
According to Proposition 4 the effect of capital intensity – and thereby also the 
effect of the interest rate and thereby possibly the effect of the degree of credit 
market competition – on equilibrium unemployment depends both on the size of 
the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital and on the relationship 
between it and product market competition, measured by the price elasticity of 
product demand. Rowthorn (1999) has argued that the elasticity of substitution is 
smaller than one. Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) have used a panel of 82 
countries over a 28-year period to estimate a general CES production function 
specification. For the entire sample they reject the Cobb-Douglas specification,  
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but for the richest group of countries σ is higher than one and for the poorest 
group of countries lower than one. 
  Finally, for the special case with a Cobb-Douglas production function we 
again reproduce the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) finding according to 
which capital stock does not affect wage formation.  
 
Corollary 3  With a Cobb-Douglas production function equilibrium 
unemployment is independent of the capital intensity. 
 
Our results regarding the relationship between labour market imperfections, 
product market imperfections, investments and equilibrium unemployment are 
related to a few recent research contributions. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and 
Spector (2004) have earlier theoretically studied the employment consequences of 
product market competition and deregulation within a bargaining framework. 
Ebell and Haefke (2003) apply a dynamic matching model to explore the dynamic 
relationship between product market competition and equilibrium unemployment. 
In contrast to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004), Ebell and 
Haefke (2003) make use of a Cournot model where the number of firms 
competing in each industry measures the intensity of product market competition. 
All these contributions, however, abstract from the determination of capital stock 
and, in particular, from its potential implications for employment by assuming 
either the linear or Cobb-Douglas production function with labour being the only 
production factor. As our study makes clear, the characterization of equilibrium 
unemployment is bound to be incomplete under such restrictions to the models. 
As we have shown, the interactions between labour market imperfections, product 
market imperfections and the capital intensity have important implications for the 
wage formation, and thereby for equilibrium unemployment. 
 
 
6  Investment decisions under labour and product 
market imperfections 
As the final part of our study we turn to briefly explore the initial stage of the 
decision-making structure, ie the decision whereby firms determine their capital 
stock. The capital stock is determined in the presence of rational expectations 
regarding the outcomes of the wage negotiation, the employment decisions and 
the price setting by firms. Hence, in the long run firms enter the industry with a 
capital stock, which is set to solve the following optimization problem 
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+ ∆ − − = π  (6.1) 
 




L w i i = π = π = Ω  
 
where ∆ = 1 + r denotes the cost of capital. The parameter c captures the cost of 
entering the industry in question. We assume, following Alesina et al (2003), that 
this entry cost is proportional to the capital stock K.
8 As these authors emphasize 
this entry cost could capture the effects of regulation on entry. Using the envelope 
theorem, according to which both  0
i L = π  and  0
i p = π , the first-order condition 
for the capital stock can be written in the cases of CES- and Cobb-Douglas 
production functions according to 
 















































In general, the capital stock depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour. 

























Expression (6.4) defines the optimal capital stock as an implicit function of the 
product and labour market imperfections. We can attach the following 
interpretation to equation (6.4). Lower costs of capital, ie more competitive capital 
markets, and lower entry costs, ie deregulation of entry barriers and entry-
promoting competition policies, will decrease the total cost, defined by the RHS 
of (6.4), so that the privately optimal capital stock will increase. Furthermore, a 
higher elasticity of substitution between products, defined by s, will decrease pi, 
which will have a negative direct effect on the capital stock. This holds true 
                                                 
8 In their model restricted to labour as the only production factor also Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) endogenize product market competition by making use of an entry cost which is 
proportional to output.  
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because intensified product market competition will reduce the marginal product 
of investment, ceteris paribus. In addition, this elasticity of demand substitution, s, 








 in a way which depends on the 
relationship between σ and s as characterized by Proposition 3. Hence, the impact 
of labour market imperfections, characterized by the wage setting mark-up, on the 
capital stock determination depends both on the degree of imperfections in the 
product markets and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. 
  Denny and Nickell (1992) have empirically studied the relationship between 
investments and unions in British industries. According to their findings the rate 
of investment is about 30% lower in firms which recognize unions relative to 
those in which unions are not recognized. Alesina et al (2003) have used OECD 
data to study how various measures of regulation in the product market, 
concerning in particular entry barriers, are related to investment behaviour. 
According to their findings product market deregulation seems to have a 
statistically significant negative effect on investment behaviour, ceteris paribus. It 
should however be emphasized that the analysis of Alesina et al abstracts from 
labour market frictions. 
  As a special case we can investigate the optimal capital stock in the absence 
of product market imperfections, ie in the limiting case with s→∞. Here both the 
price elasticity of product demand s and entry costs c have been postulated 
independently. But it is plausible that the entry cost will affect the number of 
firms and products negatively and thereby the price elasticity of products as well, 
ie n = n(c) with n′(c) < 0 and s = s(n) with s′(n) > 0 so that s′(c) < 0. 
  In the case of Cobb-Douglas production function (2.2) with the price setting 
equation (3.11) we can rewrite the first-order condition for the capital stock (6.3) 
as 
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 meaning that a higher 
interest rate factor and higher entry costs will decrease capital stock, while higher 
mark-ups due to less competitive product markets and higher aggregate nominal 
incomes will increase capital stock, ceteris paribus. If we assume that entry costs  
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will affect the number of firms and products negatively and thereby the price 
elasticity of product as well, ie n = n(c) with n′(c) < 0 and s = s(n) with s′(n) > 0 
so that s′(c) < 0, then intensified product market competition resulting from lower 
entry costs will have on ambiguous effect on investment behaviour. More 
precisely, the effect through the wage has a positive effect via price setting (see 
equation (3.11)) and a negative effect via labour demand (see equation 3.14)). The 
negative effect dominates so that a higher wage rate, due to higher outside option 
(b) or higher relative bargaining power (β), will decrease the private optimal 
capital stock. This is because capital and labour are complements in the sense that 




The employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in 
product markets have been analyzed to some extent in the recent literature. 
However, in this literature the potential role of investments has been abstracted 
away by postulating a production function with labour as the only production 
factor either in a linear (see Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, Ebell and Haefke 
2003) or Cobb-Douglas form (see Spector 2004). Our starting point has been 
similar to these studies in that we have assumed imperfect competition in the 
product and labour markets, but importantly we have generalized these models by 
assuming a more general and realistic CES-type production function, in which the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour can be different from one. 
This has established a new framework for studying the interaction effects between 
imperfections in labour and product markets and long-term investments for the 
determination of equilibrium unemployment. In particular, this has made it 
possible to explore the potential determinants of equilibrium unemployment in 
realistic environments with imperfections in both product and labour markets. 
  We have shown the following new results. While a higher degree of product 
market competition, ceteris paribus, will decrease equilibrium unemployment, the 
effect of capital intensity is more complex. The capital intensity serves as a 
strategic commitment device with which the owners of the firms can affect the 
distribution of rents achieved through bargaining in imperfectly competitive 
labour markets. In fact, the negotiated wage rate decreases, and therefore also 
equilibrium unemployment declines, as a result of higher capital intensity when 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than one, while the 
reverse happens when the elasticity of substitution is higher than one but smaller 
than the price elasticity of product demand. But if the elasticity of substitution is 
both higher than one and exceeds the price elasticity of product demand, the 
impact of capital intensity is a priori ambiguous. In this case the relative  
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bargaining power of the labour unions turns out to play an important role in 
determining what combinations of the elasticity of substitution between 
production factors and the price elasticity of product demand make higher capital 
stock increase equilibrium unemployment. As a special case of Cobb-Douglas 
production function the relationship between capital stock and equilibrium 
unemployment will vanish. 
  Finally, when the negotiated wage converges to the competitive rate the 
capital intensity does no longer - even in the case of CES production function - 
serve as a strategic commitment device which would affect the distribution of the 
rents. Thus once the labour market imperfections are eroded the capital intensity 
can no longer play such a strategic role. Finally, we demonstrated how labour and 
product market imperfections, characterized by the wage and price setting mark-
ups, affect the optimal capital stock. In particular, the optimal capital stock was 
seen to depend both on the degree of imperfections in the product markets and the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Our new theoretical findings 
raise interesting empirical questions for future research and stress the importance 
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Derivation of product demand function 
Here we derive the demand function (3.4) from the basics. Let us start to look at 
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where s > 1. Maximizing the utility function (A1.1) with respect to Di for I = 1, 2 
subject to the budget constraint M = p1D1 + p2D2 gives the following relationship 

















. Using this and the budget constraint 
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−  from which we can solve for D2, and analogously D1. 
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In order to derive the index of the aggregate price level associated with the utility 
function (A1.1) we proceed as follows. Minimizing the expenditure of getting the 
utility level u w.r.t. D i, ie min  2 2 1 1 D p D p C + =  s.t.  u U ≥ , yields 
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I = 1, 2  so  that  we  can  solve  s
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expression we get  [] s
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Finally, using the index of the aggregate price level P in (A1.2) we end up with 
equation (3.3) in the text in the case of two products. It is straightforward to 





Derivation of wage elasticity of labour demand 
By using the production function we can write the wage elasticity of labour 
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where the specification (2.1) of the text implies 
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